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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates whether inferences drawn about a population are sensitive 
to the manner by which those data are obtained. It compares information obtained using 
participatory appraisal techniques with a survey of households randomly drawn from a 
locally administered census that had been carefully revised. The community map tends to 
include household members who do not, in fact, reside in the enumerated locality. By 
contrast, the revised official census is slightly more likely to exclude household members 
who actually lived in the surveyed area. Controlling for the survey technique, we find that 
the revised official census produces higher estimates of average household size and 
wealth but lower estimates of total village size or wealth, than the community map. 
Pairwise comparison of the survey techniques, holding the households constant, shows 
that the community map leads, on average, to higher estimates of household size and 





2. Description of Survey Methods...................................................................................4 
3. Coverage Error in the Revised Official Census and the Rapid                                     
Community Appraisal.................................................................................................7 
4. Do Coverage Errors Really Matter?...........................................................................11 
5. Data Collection in Public and Private Settings...........................................................17 
6. Conclusions...............................................................................................................19 





1 Number of households (post reconciliation) on the revised official census and the    
rapid community appraisal list...................................................................................29 
 
2 A comparison of average household demographics and wealth based on a random 
sample from the revised official census (ROC) and a rapid community appraisal 
(RCA).......................................................................................................................30 
 
3 Testing for first-order stochastic dominance of household wealth distributions       
drawn from a sample of the ROC and the RCA list....................................................31 
 
4 Village size and wealth based on a sample from the ROC and the RCA list................32 
 
5 Household demographic and wealth characteristics obtained from a household      
survey and a RCA on a sample drawn from the ROC....................................................33  iv 
  
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
This paper could not have been written without the outstanding research support 
provided by Sidi Guindo and Abohurhemone Maiga and the help and cooperation of our 
respondents. We thank participants at a conference held at Yale on “Imperfect 
Information and Fieldwork in Developing Countries,” especially Esther Duflo, for helpful 
remarks on an earlier version of this paper. We also thank two referees for particularly 
useful comments that improved the paper’s exposition. Funding for data collection and 
analysis of these data have been supported by the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (TA Grant No. 301-IFPRI). We gratefully acknowledge this funding, but 
stress that ideas and opinions presented here are our responsibility and should, in no way, 
be attributed to IFAD. 
 
 
Luc Christiaensen, Cornell University  
John Hoddinott, International Food Policy Research Institute  
Gilles Bergeron, Academy for Educational Development  1 
   
1. INTRODUCTION 
Many empirical studies of household behavior in developing countries rely on 
probability sample surveys. The reasons for this are well understood. Sampling reduces 
survey costs while maintaining the ability to make valid inferences of the characteristics 
of the underlying population, provided that it is undertaken randomly. A prerequisite for 
the drawing of a random sample is a sampling frame, a list of the units in the population 
(or universe) from which the units that will be enumerated are selected. In practice, this is 
often an actual list, a set of index cards, a map, or data stored in a computer (Casley and 
Lury, 1987). But unlike sampling issues such as the choice of sample size or the 
mechanism for randomly selecting units,
1 the construction of the sample frame rarely 
receives much attention. This is unfortunate. For example, a sample frame that excludes 
the poorest households in a locality will lead to biased inferences regarding the incidence 
and severity of poverty in that community, irrespective of the quality of the data 
collection or the sophistication of the subsequent statistical analysis.  
The starting point for constructing a sampling frame is often an administrative 
list. As Casley and Lury (1987) note, these extant lists are regularly flawed. They may 
include units that do not belong to the population of interest (overcoverage), exclude a 
unit that does belong to the population of interest (undercoverage), or list the same unit 
several times. Although these flaws can be rectified by careful cross-checking, doing so 
                                                 
1 For an introduction to these issues, see Carletto (1999), Cochran (1977), Kish (1965) and Newbold 
(1988).  2 
   
is not a trivial exercise. Moreover, the need to validate these lists increases the costs of 
undertaking household surveys. 
 Even if the sample frame is carefully constructed, there exists a view that the 
information collected subsequently will be unreliable. “Again and again…the experience 
has been that large-scale surveys with long questionnaires tended to be drawn out, 
tedious, a headache to administer, a nightmare to process and write up, inaccurate and 
unreliable in data obtained, leading to reports, if any, which were long, late, boring, 
misleading, difficult to use, and anyway ignored” (Chambers, 1994a, 956). Motivated by 
concerns such as these, the last several years has seen the development of new methods 
for obtaining information on the socioeconomic characteristics of communities. One such 
approach falls under the very broad rubric of “participatory rural appraisal” (PRA). PRA 
is “a family of approaches and methods to enable rural people to share, enhance, and 
analyze their knowledge of life and conditions, to plan and to act” (Chambers, 1994b). 
There are numerous attractions to PRA approaches. They are predicated on the notion 
that local people have a wealth of knowledge that they can articulate. Further: (a) they 
allow local people to generate and analyze information on their own living conditions; (b) 
such methods foster transparency and trust; and (c) they tend to “empower” respondents 
vis-à-vis outsiders. It is also claimed that a particular PRA method—participatory village 
mapping—can be used to obtain data on demographic characteristics and measures of 
well-being more accurately than standardized household surveys and at a fraction of the 
cost (Chambers, 1994b, 1994c).  3 
   
This paper speaks to these issues. It investigates whether inferences drawn about a 
population are sensitive to the manner by which those data are obtained. Specifically, we 
started with a common sample unit (the household) and a common universe (villages in 
northern Mali). In these villages, we conducted two types of surveys. One was a 
household survey based on the random selection of respondents from a locally 
constructed administrative list that had been carefully checked. The second was the 
outcome of participatory activities—the construction of a detailed village map—in these 
communities. We sought to determine whether these two methods yielded comparable 
characterizations of these villages. 
We began by considering coverage error. We examined how a sample frame, 
based on official census lists and revised in discussion with local people, compared with 
one derived from a participatory mapping approach. We found that the revised official 
census suffered from a slightly higher level of undercoverage than the participatory map. 
However, the mapping exercise tended to lead to larger errors of overcoverage. We then 
investigated if these errors led to different conclusions with respect to certain 
characteristics of the underlying population. We controlled for the survey instrument 
used, and found that households sampled from the revised official census appear, on 
average, to be larger and wealthier. If we characterized the villages in terms of total size 
or total wealth, we obtained larger estimates from the participatory village mapping 
because of the overcoverage associated with this technique. Finally, we examined if the 
characterization of these villages was sensitive to the survey technique used. In particular, 
we compared results obtained from the same households, but drawn from different survey  4 
   
instruments. We found that the participatory village mapping, by which information on 
the households is obtained in a public setting, produced higher estimates of household 
size and lower estimates of household wealth than the household survey, in which 
households are surveyed in private. 
 
2. DESCRIPTION OF SURVEY METHODS 
The purpose of our study was to examine measures of well-being in the Zone 
Lacustre of Mali, with particular attention paid to the incidence, severity, and causes of 
household food security and child undernutrition. The survey site was centered around 
the town of Niafunké, approximately 200 kilometers southwest of Tombouctou. Since the 
mid-1980s, this area has been the scene of regular food aid interventions and increased 
development activity, driven largely by external donors, a feature we return to in our 
conclusion. In this region of Mali, people live in villages that take the form of nucleated 
settlements. Within the villages, individuals live in dwellings or huts grouped together in 
a compound surrounded by a wall. One further distinguishes families, who consist of 
several households linked by kinship. As the household forms the basic social unit in this 
locality, and hence the basic unit for our analysis, we needed to construct a list of all 
households actually living in each village to be surveyed. Following local practice, 
households were defined as consumption units, that is, collections of individuals eating 
from a common pot. These individuals recognized a common authority, the household 
head, and shared their incomes. Although household members usually lived together in  5 
   
the same dwelling or hut, this was not always the case. For example, it was not 
uncommon for brothers to live together with their wives and children in separate 
dwellings within the same compound, while still sharing their meals with and 
acknowledging their father as household head. These individuals also composed one 
household. Households typically consisted of parents and their children, and sometimes 
grandparents, brothers or sisters, and adopted children. Following local practice, 
polygamous households were counted as separate if each constituted a separate 
consumption unit and the women did not share their income or live in the same dwelling. 
After discussions with local authorities in which we explained the purpose of our 
survey and guaranteed the confidentiality of data obtained, we were granted access to an 
administrative listing of families residing in each village. These had been compiled in 
1996, the year before the study began. They serve several purposes, including providing a 
basis for village taxation and the delivery of food aid. In theory, these are kept up-to-date 
by local government officials. When we began our survey work, we were aware that such 
lists might well be inaccurate and that it would be necessary to distinguish between 
families, who were identified on these lists, and households, which were not. 
Consequently, in each village surveyed, we took these lists to a meeting with the village 
head and a conclave of elders. Collectively, the list was reviewed to identify families that 
no longer resided in the village and, where necessary, distinguish households from 
families. This generated a list households and made it possible to eliminate names that 
were no longer resident. Households, resident in the village but not registered as such, 
were added. In other words, we revised an official listing that purported to enumerate  6 
   
everyone within a prescribed locality (as opposed to working with a self-description of 
the community). Accordingly, we called the sample frame that resulted from this exercise 
the revised official census (ROC),
2 which was used to take a one-third sample of each 
village. Using a structured questionnaire that included questions on household 
composition, assets, income, expenditures, and anthropometry, enumerators resident in 
the villages being studied interviewed households four times over a one-year period.  
Our second method draws from a technique popularly used in participatory rural 
appraisal. In the strictest sense of the word, we did not undertake PRA. A better 
description is that we undertook a rapid community appraisal, in that we included 
community members in the research and relied on participatory methods.
3 We consulted 
with the village head in each village to ask permission to get the entire village together 
for an exercise of constructing a village map and to establish a convenient time and place 
that would ensure the maximum participation of all village members. At the appointed 
time, we began by outlining the purpose and methods of the exercise. The village head 
would begin by constructing his compound and his dwelling within it, using banco (the 
local material used to make dwellings), as well as the location of the village mosque. 
Another person was requested to identify the locations of the main tracks within the 
village and individuals were encouraged to locate their own dwellings and compounds. 
As the map neared completion, we discussed the concept of household with the 
participants, and starting from the dwellings on the map, we identified all households 
                                                 
2 Our thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this term. 
3 The phrase rapid community assessment was coined by Dan Maxwell.  7 
   
residing in the village. Where the inhabitants of two or more dwellings composed only 
one household, this was so indicated. Local materials such as twigs and stones were used 
to represent the number of people resident in each household, the number of livestock, 
and the amount of land they operated. Typically, the entire exercise took one to two 
hours. In keeping with the spirit of PRA, the research team “handed over the stick” 
(Chambers, 1994a). That is, beyond facilitating participation at the beginning, we stood 
by while the map was constructed. As far as we could tell, residents in these villages 
greatly enjoyed this exercise. Once it was well underway, we began to systematically 
record the information being presented to us—constructing a listing of all households; 
recording the quantitative information being presented; and transferring to paper the 
three-dimensional map that had been created. We call this the RCA listing. 
 
3. COVERAGE ERROR IN THE REVISED OFFICIAL CENSUS AND THE 
RAPID COMMUNITY APPRAISAL 
Our first step was to compare the names of the households appearing on the ROC 
and the RCA listing. This initial comparison revealed that there were many households 
present on one list but absent from the other. To determine whether these discrepancies 
were real (as opposed to resulting from mundane factors such as misspellings of names), 
we arranged meetings with the village authorities. We went through the ROC and 
reconciled it to both the RCA list and the village map. Households that could not be 
identified were noted separately. We then went through the RCA list, locating on the 
village map those households not appearing on the ROC. As a final check, we tried again  8 
   
to locate households that appeared on the ROC but not on the RCA listing. These 
reconciliations were lengthy and somewhat exhausting. In one of the larger villages, it 
took four researchers, the village head, and five of his advisors nearly five hours to 
reconcile the lists. However, it proved to be time extremely well spent. In particular, two 
sources of discrepancies were identified. First, in some cases the lists had been produced 
several months apart. (The ROCs were done in August and September, 1997 while the 
RCA listings were compiled over from August, 1997 to February, 1998.) In and out 
migration, deaths of household heads, and household reformation accounted for some of 
the differences between the lists. A more important source of discrepancy was confusion 
over the names of household heads. There were people with completely different names 
on different lists and people with just slightly different names. For example, in one 
village Abdoulaye Traoré was also known as Hamedi Traoré,
4 and Hamadou Yattara and 
Amadou Yattara also proved to be the same person. But more complicated cases also 
arose. For example, in one village Ali Baba Touré appeared on the ROC and Baba Ali 
Touré was on the RCA list. They turned out to be different people: the former being the 
father who passed away between the construction of the two lists and the latter being his 
son who took his place as head of household. Also, despite our best attempts to use 
consistently a local definition of the household, confusion continued to arise. For 
example, a single young man who had his own compound, was described as being the 
                                                 
4 These names are pseudonyms. We use them to convey a sense of the challenges that we encountered 
when reconciling these lists.  9 
   
head of a household, but slept in one compound (where he appeared on the ROC) while 
regularly eating in another (his sister’s, who appeared on the RCA list). 
This reconciliation exercise greatly reduced the number of discrepancies between 
the two lists. We again distinguished three groups: households appearing on both lists and 
those only appearing on the ROC or the RCA list. Table 1 presents the number in each 
group for the villages in which we undertook this comparative exercise. Roughly three 
quarters (72 percent) of all households listed appeared on both lists. Less than 5 percent 
appeared on only the ROC list, while 23  percent appeared on only the RCA list. A 
detailed case-by-case analysis showed that most of the households missed by the 
community mapping exercise should have been included. In some cases, these were 
households that appeared on the participatory map but whose names had been mistakenly 
omitted when this information was put onto a list. Furthermore, members of certain 
ethnic groups, the Tamasheq, Peulh, and Bozos tended to be excluded from the RCA 
lists. The Tamasheq and Peulh live a semi-nomadic life, the Bozos are fishers. Members 
of these groups were often absent on the day that the mapping exercise took place and 
their houses were not listed by their neighbors or other community members. In other 
words, the RCA list had an undercoverage rate of 5  percent—it omitted 22 out of a total 
of 430 households (368 + 22 + 40) that should have appeared on both lists. 
By contrast, approximately two-thirds of the households appearing only on the 
RCA list did not in fact meet the criteria for being a household in this village. The 
principal reason for this was that during the physical construction of the community map, 
a number of dwellings were modeled that belonged to individuals who had out-migrated  10 
   
and who no longer resided in the village. Furthermore, some households were counted 
twice, as they occupied separate houses in the same village. In the case of Tomba, the 
community map inadvertently included part of a neighboring settlement. In the confusion 
surrounding the physical construction of the map (at one point, more than 100 people 
were building the model of Tomba) this error went unnoticed. The community mapping 
exercise thus led to an overcoverage error of 19 percent, i.e., it included 80 households 
more than the 430 households that should have been included in both lists. Finally, 40 
households appearing on the RCA list, should also have been picked up by the revised 
official census—resulting in an undercoverage error of 9 percent for the ROC (40 
households out of 430). 
To conclude, both approaches produced relatively small undercoverage errors, 
with undercoverage slightly more pronounced in case of the ROC. The participatory 
village map, however, also produced a significant error of overcoverage. We surmise that 
in the case of the administrative lists that we used to construct the ROC, there are both 
advantages (gaining access to food aid) and disadvantages (paying taxes) associated with 
being on the list. Finally, before proceeding with our household survey, we undertook 
several additional steps to check the lists, and this too may have reduced under and 
overcoverage. By contrast, the communities being studied were confident that they would 
suffer no adverse affect from appearing on the participatory map. Indeed, they perceived 
that benefits, such as food aid or development interventions, might be made available to 
them—despite the efforts of the research team to emphasize that this would not be the  11 
   
case—and so had an incentive to list empty dwellings as resident households as well as 
duplicate households.  
 
4. DO COVERAGE ERRORS REALLY MATTER? 
We have shown that both the ROC and the RCA generated different listings of 
households within the same villages, although the real differences were much smaller 
than the apparent ones. Do these differences matter? Recall that the purpose of our survey 
work was to describe and analyze measures of well-being in these villages. In the case of 
the RCAs, such indicators were obtained using various participatory techniques.
5 The 
ROC was used as a sampling frame, from which a random selection of households was 
drawn. Data collected from this sample were then used to draw inferences about the 
underlying population or about causal relations such as the relationship between food 
consumption, wealth, and household demographic characteristics. In either case, a 
discrepancy between the “true population” and that enumerated by the RCA list or the 
ROC could lead to biased estimates of these characteristics. The magnitude of this bias 
forms one basis for assessing these two methods. The other important criterion is cost 
effectiveness, as higher validity might come at the price of higher survey costs. 
The manner in which both over- and undercoverage error introduces bias in a 
statistic depends on the form of the statistic itself (Groves, 1989). Here, we consider both 
                                                 
5 In addition to the community map, we held focus group discussions on local perceptions of the concepts 
of food security and causes of hunger, constructed time lines and classified households using pile sorts.   12 
   
village total and village mean demographic and wealth characteristics as well as the 
distribution of household wealth.
6 In this region of Mali, the village totals are especially 
relevant because the provision of food aid is often based on measures of village size, such 
as total village population or total number of female-headed households. Consequently, 
biased estimates of these sums could lead to a misallocation of scarce resources. 
In the appendix to this paper, we show that for linear statistics such as totals or 
means, the bias induced by coverage error consists of two components: an undercoverage 
and an overcoverage error term. These have opposite signs. Each term consists of the 
relative importance of the error, as measured by their proportion with respect to the total 
population, and the difference in the survey statistic between those appearing in the (ROC 
or RCA) list and those who are wrongly omitted or included. The key insights are the 
following. 
First, even if a large proportion of the population is erroneously excluded, this 
does not necessarily induce large biases as long as the characteristics of the population 
excluded closely resemble those of the population covered. On the other hand, even a 
small undercoverage error might well lead to substantial bias if those excluded have very 
different characteristics compared to the households on a given list. The effect of 
overcoverage can be interpreted in an analogous fashion. Second, the joint effect of 
undercoverage and overcoverage depends on the magnitudes of the differences—they can 
either exacerbate or offset each other. Third, the bias induced by coverage error will not 
                                                 
6 An introductory discussion of the effect of coverage error on analytical statistics such as measures of the 
(causal) relationship between variables, such as regression coefficients is found in Groves (1989).  13 
   
necessarily be constant across different variables. Undercoverage of pastoralists (such as 
Peulh and Tamasheq people) by the village mapping for example, might lead to greater 
bias with respect to average livestock ownership without affecting average household 
size. Fourth, in the case of sums, the bias consists of an undercoverage and an 
overcoverage term, opposite in sign, and each a product of their respective number and 
mean value. Large differences in the numbers of households wrongly included and 
excluded, can thus lead to substantial overestimates or underestimates of the sum total of 
interest, even if the mean values of the overcovered and undercovered populations are 
alike.  
We now examine whether coverage error actually does change our inferences. 
Ideally, we would estimate the absolute magnitude of the coverage error bias for each 
method by comparing computed statistics against their “true” value. However, because 
the “true” value is unknown, we could not do this. However, we could examine their 
performance relative to each other by comparing statistics generated by both methods. In 
the appendix, we show that the difference in these statistics equals the difference in their 
coverage bias. 
Before undertaking this evaluation, we need to be cognizant of two additional 
factors. Characterizations derived from households randomly drawn from the ROC and 
those obtained from the RCA list will also be affected by the fact that these data were 
collected in different settings. The randomly selected households were administered a 
structured, largely quantitative questionnaire in a relatively private setting—the 
household courtyard—by an enumerator who could validate the information being  14 
   
provided by direct observation (cross-checks were also built into the questionnaire). By 
contrast, the community map was built in a highly public setting. Validation of 
information provided here came through comments and corrections made by other 
members of the community. In section 5, we further consider the impact of these settings 
on the data we collected. Here, in order to focus solely on the impact of differences in 
coverage, we need to use data collected in exactly the same manner. Accordingly, Tables 
2, 3 and 4 use data derived only from the community map. With these data, we compare 
the characteristics of those households drawn randomly from ROC to all households 
appearing on the map.
7  
Second, since our statistics about the population enumerated in the ROC are 
obtained from a randomly selected sample, we need to construct confidence intervals for 
these estimates. Suppose that the value of the statistic drawn from the RCA falls outside 
this confidence interval. If this is the case, we can conclude that at least some of the 
differences in these statistics is due to coverage error. The further away the RCA statistic 
is from the confidence interval, the larger the bias induced by the choice of sampling 
frame. If the RCA statistic falls within the confidence interval, differences between the 
statistics obtained from the ROC and the RCA could be attributed to randomness induced 
by sampling. Although coverage error may also be playing some role, we cannot discern 
an effect that is separate from randomness in the estimated statistic. 
                                                 
7 This is possible, since all households sampled for the detailed household questionnaire (but one) also 
appear on the list resulting from the community map.  15 
   
From Table 2, it can be seen that average household size across all villages is 
larger in the sample randomly drawn from the ROC than from the RCA, the difference 
being statistically significant at the 5 percent confidence level. The same result holds for 
each village separately, though due to relatively small sample sizes, the differences are 
not statistically significant. Sampling from the ROC leads to overestimates of household 
size relative to the RCA. As the original administrative list—the basis for the ROC—only 
reflected registered families, this suggests that small households within the family, often 
only consisting of a few older (sometimes sick or handicapped) people, were 
underreported as separate households during the revision. Similarly, all unregistered 
small households might not have been included. 
One might expect that these erroneously omitted households will tend to be 
poorer. This hypothesis can be tested, either by comparing average household wealth or 
by looking at the distribution of wealth. Table 2 shows that almost all indicators of 
average household wealth are higher for the sample drawn from the ROC. Yet, we cannot 
conclude that this is a statistically significant difference, as the values for the RCA listing 
fall within sample confidence intervals. Further analysis of the distributions of household 
wealth however, shows that the households on the ROC list are richer. In particular, we 
examined whether the distribution of household wealth based on our sample from the 
ROC lies unambiguously to the right of the distribution of all households listed on the  16 
   
community map. We did so using first-order stochastic dominance analysis.
8 Specifically, 
we calculate a Kolmogorov test statistic, which measures the maximum vertical distance 
between the cumulative density function of the sample drawn from the ROC (S(x)) and 
the values obtained from the RCA (C(x)) (Conover, 1980). The test statistics reported in 
Table 3 indicate that the household wealth distribution of the sample from the ROC first-
order stochastically dominates the household wealth distribution of the community map 
in virtually all villages.
9  
Taken together, Tables 2 and 3 suggest that the village maps constructed as part 
of the RCA also capture smaller and poorer households. Consequently, estimates of mean 
values of household size and wealth tend to be smaller when we compare the RCA data 
with those obtained from households drawn from the ROC. This may be related to the 
fact that the village map visualizes all housing units, also those of poorer and smaller 
households, thereby increasing their probability of appearing on the list. But recall that 
we are also interested in the summation of village characteristics. In the case of RCA, we 
added up the quantitative information provided to us by each household. Totals for the 
ROC are obtained by multiplying the means from Table 2 by the total number of 
households on the ROC. 
                                                 
8 Formally, first-order stochastic dominance of a distribution S over a distribution C is equivalent to the 
condition that the cumulative density function S(x) of distribution S is always equal to or smaller than the 
cumulative density function C(x) of distribution C, with S(x) < C(x) for some x and x ˛ X, the wealth 
range of both distributions. 
9 In Table 3 we only compare the distributions of cattle and sheep/goat ownership because the ownership of 
ploughs, carts and proahs, and draft animals is generally limited to at most one per household. Percentages 
of equipment and draft animal ownership are reported in Table 2.  17 
   
Table 4 shows that with respect to total population, almost all RCA demographic 
variables lie outside the 95 percent confidence interval, being significantly larger than the 
ROC sample estimates. The one exception, total residential population, lies just on the 
boundary of the confidence interval. These results are due to the large overcoverage error 
on the RCA list. The participatory mapping exercise produced an estimate of village 
population about 10 percent higher than the ROC sample. Although average household 
size derived from the community map is smaller than in the sample, the overcoverage in 
the RCA list more than compensates for this. Given that food aid is mostly related to the 
total population, this is not an innocuous finding. Further note that the reported number of 
migrant members is about 33 percent higher in the RCA list. This result, driven by 
overcoverage, is further reinforced by the particular nature of the overcoverage error. 
Several dwellings modeled were no longer inhabited, especially in Tomba, and their 
former residents were listed twice, as household members and as migrant members, 
increasing the average number of migrant members per household amongst the wrongly 
included households.  
 
5.  DATA COLLECTION IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SETTINGS 
We now turn to a third question associated with these two methods, whether the 
mode of data collection—in a public or a private setting—might also affect the results we 
obtained. We took the households that appeared on both lists and compared the 
characteristics reported in the household survey (obtained by enumerators resident in the  18 
   
village) with those obtained via the community mapping, where either a household 
member or a well-informed neighbor or resource person provided the information. The 
results of this comparison, summarized across all villages, are reported in Table 5.  
We find that the estimates of household size are significantly higher in the 
community mapping and reported levels of asset ownership (with the exception of draft 
animals) significantly lower. Differences in other demographic variables were not 
statistically significant. The first finding is consistent with the larger overcoverage error 
reported for the community maps. As it was perceived that only benefits could be 
acquired (potentially through food aid or development projects) from appearing on the 
participatory mapping (despite our repeated efforts to explain that this was not the case), 
villagers had incentives to maximize the number of households in the village. Similar 
motivations would lead to reporting higher household sizes. These influences might be 
more easily overcome during the personal interview with a structured household 
questionnaire, where group pressure is absent and more triangulation opportunities are 
available. 
It is notoriously difficult to obtain credible data on assets, especially livestock 
ownership. Our experience during the several household survey rounds, with several 
opportunities to verify the numbers reported, suggested that the household survey 
numbers are lower bounds. Consequently, the RCA figures must be underestimates. It 
may be that in these very poor communities, individuals are reluctant to reveal their asset 
holdings in public. Furthermore, reporting high asset ownership might be perceived as 
detrimental to receiving potential future aid.   19 
   
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we compared information on five villages derived from a sample 
drawn from an ROC and from a participatory village mapping exercise. We found that 
both methods generate a small amount of undercoverage, but the community mapping 
work also leads to significant overcoverage. When we controlled for the survey 
instrument used (by relying only on data obtained from the construction of the village 
maps), we found that households sampled from the ROC appear, on average, to be larger 
and wealthier. If we characterize these villages in terms of total size or total wealth, we 
obtained larger estimates from the RCA list because of the overcoverage associated with 
this technique. When comparisons are restricted to households that appear in both the 
random sample drawn from the ROC and the community map—that is, comparing results 
from different survey instruments controlling for the sample frame—we find that the 
latter produced higher estimates of household size and lower estimates of wealth. 
Before concluding, we note two caveats. First, we must be careful not to over-
generalize from these findings. They pertain to a particular region. Whether they are 
replicable elsewhere is an empirical question. Second, even if outsiders and participants 
agree on concepts and definitions, there can still remain differences in interpretation and 
application. Although we adopted local definitions of households, there will always be 
borderline cases. In the context of household surveys, our enumerators had criteria by 
which they could adjudicate, for example, the definition of a “migrant.” By contrast, in  20 
   
the participatory mapping exercise, respondents undertook this adjudication. This is not 
to say that one set of criteria was more valid, but rather that the same criteria can be used 
in different ways by different actors. Similar considerations can be attributed to the 
notion of a village. We followed local administrative conventions that defined villages in 
geographical terms. By contrast, village boundaries and village membership did not 
always conform to administrative boundaries. This can be seen in those instances where 
certain ethnic minorities did not appear for the participatory activities (because they 
formed a separate group and therefore did not “live” within the village) or where local 
boundaries differed from administrative ones. 
Mindful of these caveats, these results can be read in a number of ways. They can 
be used to support the claim that participatory mapping is more accurate than a sample of 
households randomly drawn from an ROC because it is less likely to exclude poorer, 
smaller households. Conversely, participatory mapping could be regarded as less accurate 
due to the overcoverage we observe and the apparent underreporting of assets. 
Our interpretation is somewhat different. We surmise that these results are 
principally driven by the particular dynamics of these different activities. Despite our best 
efforts to remain “invisible” during the participatory mapping exercise, we suspect that 
even our minimal presence was sufficient to induce households to alter their responses. In 
an environment where everyone is aware that most outsiders are associated with financial 
resources that are to be disbursed, data may be as much the outcome of social interactions  21 
   
as they are immutable “facts.”
10 Thus, for example, the “number of people resident in a 
household” is not just a figure to be measured, but also possibly part of a negotiation with 
a respondent, who perceives that financial gain may come from proposing a higher figure 
than is actually the case. A different set of social interactions affected our household 
survey. As discussed in Section 5, here, there were repeated measurements of these data 
conducted in a private, rather than public gathering, and often interviewing was 
supplemented with direct observation and triangulation with other information in the 
questionnaire. 
If our supposition is correct—that different survey techniques generate different 
social dynamics between research teams and their respondents—then it is incorrect to 
claim the “superiority” of one method over another. Instead, it is important to carefully 
examine and acknowledge the biases that may result from the particular method being 
used. It also points to the importance of triangulating, or cross-checking, information that 
is obtained. We further stress that our use of both techniques was not driven so much by a 
desire to determine the “right method,” but rather by our desire to enrich our 
understanding of these villages. The participatory appraisal techniques allowed us to 
interact with certain groups, such as women, that was simply infeasible when visiting 
individual households. They also allowed us to observe the dynamics of these villages 
literally “at work,” and led to a more nuanced understanding of dynamics within these 
villages (such as relations between different ethnic groups) as well as their relationships 
                                                 
10 These issues are discussed further in Lockwood (1992).  22 
   
with outsiders such as ourselves. Our quantitative surveys enabled us to complement 
these understandings with a more detailed, in-depth look at a wide variety of measures of 
deprivation.  23 
   
APPENDIX 
DERIVING ESTIMATES OF BIAS DUE TO UNDERCOVERAGE AND 
OVERCOVERAGE 
Below, we derive the formulae for estimating biases due to undercoverage and 
overcoverage. In what follows below, Nj will refer to numbers of households in category 
j, and Sj will refer to the statistic (for example, mean household size) calculated for 
households in the jth category. Recall that we distinguished between households on the 
ROC and RCA lists, households that were covered on both lists, and households that 





Households common to the ROC and the RCA list, i.e., that 
appear on both lists. 
 
Nc 
Households that correctly appear on the ROC, but not on the 
RCA list, i.e., an undercoverage error of the RCA list. 
 
Nu,rca 
Households that wrongly appear on the ROC, but not on the 
RCA list, i.e., an overcoverage error on the ROC. 
 
No,roc 
Households that correctly appear on the RCA list, but not on the 
ROC, i.e., an undercoverage error on the ROC. 
 
Nu,roc 
Households that wrongly appear on the RCA list, but not on the 
ROC, i.e., an overcoverage error on the RCA list. 
 
No,rca 
Total number of households on the ROC. 
  Nroc 
Total number of households on the RCA list. 
  Nrca 
Total number of households. 
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Similarly, Sc refers to the statistic for households that appear on both the ROC and 
the RCA list, Su,rca refers to the statistic for households that correctly appear on the ROC 
list but not on the RCA list, and so on. Note that we assume here that the “true 
population” is the sum of households appearing on both the ROC and RCA lists as well 
as those that were undercovered on one list, but not the other (N = Nc + Nu,roc + Nu,rca). By 
doing so, we can express any linear survey statistic about the “true population” as the 
sum of three components: 
 
S    = (Nc / N) @ Sc + (Nu,rca / N) @ Su,rca + (Nu,roc / N) @ Su,roc  (1) 
 
Sroc = (Nc / Nroc) @ Sc + (No,roc / Nroc) @ So,roc + (Nu,rca / Nroc) @ Su,rca  (2) 
 
Srca = (Nc / Nrca) @ Sc + (No,rca / Nrca) @ So,rca + (Nu,roc / Nrca) @ Su,roc  (3) 
 
To illustrate the nature of the bias caused by coverage error, multiply equation (2) 
by (Nroc / N) and add (– (No,roc / N) @ So,roc + (Nu,roc / N) @ Su,roc) to yield 
 
S = (Nroc / N) @ Sroc – (No,roc / N) @ So,roc + (Nu,roc / N) @ Su,roc . (4) 
 
Note that Nroc = Nc + No,roc + Nu,rca.  By adding (Nu,roc / N) @ (Sroc ) to both sides 
and rearranging terms, equation (4) can be expressed as 
 
Sroc = S + [ (Nu,roc  / N) @ (Sroc – Su,roc) – (No,roc / N) @ (Sroc – So,roc) ]. (5) 
 
A similar manipulation of equation (3) yields: 
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Srca = S + [ (Nu,rca  / N) @ (Srca – Su,rca) – (No,rca  / N) @ (Srca – So,rca) ] (6) 
 
Equations (5) and (6) show that the bias induced by coverage error consists of two 
components: an undercoverage and an overcoverage error term. Both terms have opposite 
signs and are each the product of their relative importance, as expressed by their 
proportion with respect to the total population of interest, and the difference in the survey 
statistic between those covered in the frame population and those who were not covered 
or wrongly covered. 
Sum totals are calculated by multiplying mean values by the number of household 
listed under both methods. The effect of coverage error on sum totals can be expressed as 
the sum of two components: 
 
Nroc @ ￿roc = N @ ￿ – Nu,roc @ ￿u,roc + No,roc @ ￿o,roc (7) 
and 
Nrca @ ￿rca = N @ ￿ – Nu,rca @ ￿u,rca + No,rca @ ￿o,rca (8) 
 
where ￿ is the mean value of variable S of the population of interest and ￿j is the mean 
value of variable S of group j, with the subscripts j taking the same meaning as above. 
Finally, note that by respectively differencing equations (5) and (6) and (7) and 
(8), the difference between the statistics obtained from each method equals the difference 
in their coverage bias. That is, 
 
Droc,rca = Sroc – Srca = ((Nu,roc / N) @ (Sroc – Su,roc) – (No,roc / N) @ (Sroc – So,roc))   26 
   
 (Srca – Su,rca) – (No,rca / N) @ (Srca – So,rca))   (9) 
and 
 
DTroc,rca = Nroc @ ￿roc – Nrca @ ￿rca = (– Nu,roc @ ￿u,roc + No,roc @ ￿o,roc ) 
– (– Nu,rca @ ￿u,rca + No,rca @ ￿o,rca)   (10) 
 
where Droc,rca is the difference between the values of linear statistic obtained from the 
ROC and RCA lists and DTroc,rca is the difference between the values of the sum total 
obtained from the ROC and RCA lists.   27 
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Table 1￿ ￿Number of households (post reconciliation) on the revised official census 




reconciliation)  by 
village  On both lists 
Only on the 
revised official 
census list 























Total = 515  368  27  120 
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Table 2￿ ￿A comparison of average household demographics and wealth based on a random sample from the revised 





Touskel  Anguira  Tomba  N’goro 






ROC  RCA 
Sample 
from 
ROC  RCA 
Sample 
from 
ROC  RCA 
Sample 
from 
ROC  RCA 
Sample 
from 
ROC  RCA 
Sample 
from 
ROC  RCA 
Household Demographics 
Household size (residential) 
 
Percentage of households with    
migrants 
Percentage of Sonraï 
households 










































































































Percentage of households with 
carts,  ploughs or proahs 
Percentage of households with 
draft animals 
Number of cattle per household 
 




















































































































Number of observations  11  33  14  41  24  79  39  170  60  158  148  481 
Notes:  Confidence intervals are in parentheses. These are based on t-values for averages and continuity corrected z-values for proportions.  For Anguira 
and Tomba, data on cattle, sheep, and goats were recorded as 1 if households possessed any of these animals, zero otherwise. Consequently, 
numbers for Anguira and Tomba are not considered in the figures found in the last column. Figures in italics for these two villages are 
percentages of households reporting ownership.   For 7 households on the RCA list in Anguira and Tomba, information was missing or 
incomplete. As their number is negligible compared to the total population for these two villages, their potential impact on the census averages 
has been ignored.  31 
 
Table 3￿ ￿Testing for first-order stochastic dominance of household wealth distributions drawn from a sample of the 
ROC and the RCA list 
 
Value of Kolmogorov test statistic 
T (=sup(S(x)-C(x))  Tomi 
Goundam 
Touskel  Anguira  Tomba  N’goro 
Total from 
villages 
Distribution of Household Wealth 
Number of cattle per household  
 



























Critical value for T at 5% significance. level   0.35  0.31  0.24  0.19  0.15  0.13 
Number of observations  12  14  24  39  60  85 
  Notes:  We do not reject the null hypothesis that the household wealth distribution from the sample of the ROC first-order 
stochastically dominates the household wealth distribution from the RCA in cases where the computed Kolmogorov 
test statistic is less than the critical value.  For Anguira and Tomba, data on animals were collected in a qualitative 
manner. Consequently, both villages have been excluded in the calculation of the test statistics for the total population 
reported in the last column.   The reported critical values for the Kolmogorov test statistic are only exact when the 
reference cumulative density function (the RCA distribution in our case) is continuous. Otherwise the critical values 
tend to be conservative. The exact critical values for discrete reference distributions are often only one-third of their 
continuous counterparts. Exact critical values for discrete reference distributions, however, are not tabulated and their 
calculation is not straightforward (Conover, 1980). We therefore start by taking as critical value, one-third of the exact 
critical values for the corresponding continuous distributions. If the Kolmogorov statistic is well below this value, we 
can be confident not to reject the null-hypothesis.  32 
 
Table 4￿ ￿Village size and wealth based on a sample from the ROC and the RCA list 
 
Tomi  Goundam Touskel  Anguira  Tomba  N’goro  Total from all five 
villages 
  Sample 
from 
ROC  RCA 
Sample 
from 
ROC  RCA 
Sample 
from 
ROC  RCA 
Sample 
from 
ROC  RCA 
Sample 
from 
ROC  RCA 
Sample 
from 




Number of migrants  
 
Number of Sonraï  
households 









































































































Number of observations  35  33  41  41  72  82  117  174  130  158  395  488 
Village Wealth 
Number of carts, ploughs and 
proahs  
Number of draft animals  
 
Number of cattle per 
household 
Number of sheep and goats 






































































Number of observations  35  33  41  41          130  158  206  232 
Notes: Confidence intervals are in parentheses. For Anguira and Tomba data on material possessions (carts, ploughs and proahs) and animals were collected in a 
qualitative manner. For these two villages indicators on asset ownership have not been reported and the totals in the last column reflect asset ownership for 
the total population in the remaining villages.    33 
 
 
Table 5￿ ￿Household demographic and wealth characteristics obtained from a 
household survey and a RCA on a sample drawn from the ROC 
 
  Household averages across five villages 
  Household Survey  RCA  t- or z-value 
Household Demographics 
   Household size (residential) 
   Number of migrants per household 
   Percentage Sonraï households 
   Percentage male-headed households 

















Household Wealth        
   Number of carts, ploughs and proahs per household  0.26  0.15  2.82 * 
   Number of draft animals per household  0.15  0.15  0 
   Number of draft animals per household  2.61  0.72  5.43* 
   Number of sheep and goats per household  8.27  2.32  6.47 * 








Notes: Data on household wealth exclude Anguira and Tomba; see Table 2 for explanation. 
* statistically significant at 5  percent level; paired sampled t-value for comparison of 
means, paired sample z-value for comparison of proportions. See Newbold (1988) for 
derivation of these test statistics.  34 
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